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Beyond No-Fault
By Allan C. Hutchinsont
"[AJll fortune, good and bad, is to be shared in common by the community
as a whole."
-Lysias t
The debate between the "faulters" and the "no-faulters" continues
unabated.2 Indeed, in the last few years, discussion has become even
more furious and partisan. Only recently in retreat, the "faulters" seem
to have experienced something of a sudden renaissance; they have
regrouped and launched a fresh defence of the "fault" status quo. This
articulation of tort theory represents a major part of contemporary legal
scholarship.3 Unfortunately, there is little new on offer, and the debate
seems well past the point where further argument or evidence might
affect its resolution. Its participants cannot agree on what systemic aims
the law should pursue, let alone on the relative priorities of these aims.
As with most legal debates, the problem is as much ideological as
intellectual. Both the "faulters" and "no-faulters" can claim some ana-
lytical and statistical support for their interpretations of the arguments
and the evidence. At bottom, the categories of "fact" and "truth" cannot
be divorced from the ideological presuppositions of the categorizer. We
cannot discard our ideological presuppositions and achieve some ahistor-
t Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. LL.B. (Hons.)
1974, London University; LL.M. 1978, Manchester University. Barrister 1975, Gray's Inn, London.
I benefited from critical comments by Reuben Hasson, Terry Ison, and Patrick Monahan on an
earlier draft of this essay. Also, I am especially grateful to Michael Gottheil and Pino DiEmedio for
their industry and imagination.
1. Quoted in K. FREEMAN, THE MURDER OF HERODES AND OTHER TRIALS FROM THE
ATHENIAN LAW COURTS 167 (1946).
2. By "faulters," I mean those who favour retaining the torts system, albeit in some reformed
state, whether under a negligence or strict liability regime. These include Epstein, Posner, Priest,
Rosenberg, Shapo, and Weinrib. By "no-faulters," I mean those who would abandon the tort sys-
tem, at least in part, and introduce some no-fault accident scheme, whether comprehensive or tai-
lored, in its place. These include O'Connell, Keeton, Calabresi, Henderson, and Havinghurst. I do
not necessarily include those who favour a universal disability scheme, such as Ison, Abel, and
Franklin. As regards Sugarman, despite his irresistible assault on the tort system and his commend-
able desire for an integrated scheme of income support and medical care, he places undue reliance on
the example of "the progressive employer." Furthermore, he tacitly accepts the economic and polit-
ical substructure of modern liberal society. See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 642-50 (1985). Also, in contrast to the democratic proposals I make, Sugarman allows very
little room for increased citizen participation in his suggested reforms. Id. at 658.
3. For a critical, if idiosyncratic, summary of the literature, see Hutchinson & Morgan, The
Canengusian Connection: The Kaleidoscope of Tort Theory, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 69 (1984).
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ical or universal standpoint.4 Each view, "no-fault" and "fault," depends
on rarely articulated foundational assumptions about the nature of
human personality and social organization. Proposals to provide health
care and income support to the injured and unhealthy reflect a commit-
ment to deep normative principles and raise important questions about
social justice and political obligation. How we take care of the social
victims of bad fortune is (or ought to be) an integral part of our collective
and individual self-image and self-understanding. It speaks to the kind of
individuals and community we aspire to be. The tort system is merely a
part of a larger societal problem-entitlement to and provision of health
care and income support benefits. This essay will focus as much on the
welfare forest as on the tort trees.
Insofar as the debate has dealt with these issues, the general view
seems to be that the "faulters" adopt a conservative ideology of individu-
alism.' Their ambition is to facilitate individual freedom and choice. On
the other hand, the "no-faulters" are depicted as supporting a more col-
lectivistic political morality. They emphasize the universalization of
compensation benefits.6 In this short essay I contend that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom, these characterizations are misleading. Both
groups are beholden to a liberal credo; they share an individualistic
vision of social arrangements and political justice. Although there are
degrees of orthodoxy within each group, the difference between the
groups is much less than meets the eye. We should not mistake their
social accoutrements and political trappings for their substantive views.
I agree with Holmes's belief that "[t]orts is not a proper subject for a
law book"7 and, between the two, I would undoubtedly prefer a move to
some no-fault scheme of accident compensation. But I do not think that
there can be any real improvement unless there is a crucial shift in the
4. See Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction (Book Review),
94 YALE L.J. 209, 211-14, 227-32 (1984). This point is succinctly made by David Lewis: "Philo-
sophical theories are never refuted conclusively. . . . The theory survives its refutation-at a
price. . . . Our "intuitions" are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same .... Once
the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. . . ." A.
MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 267 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting 1 D. LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS x-xi
(1983)).
5. Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 27, 32-33, 68 (1980). Of course, there are many self-proclaimed exceptions to this
general trend. For instance, Guido Calabresi portrays tort as the paradigmatic law of the politically
mixed society. See Calabresi, Torts--The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEx. L. REV. 519 (1978).
However, it would not be unfair to characterize him as a liberal, albeit as one sensitive to communal
responsibilities. See, eg., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
6. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 369-77 (6th ed. 1983). One judge went so far as to
condemn enterprise liability and risk spreading as "socialistic." Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265
Or. 259, 296-97, 509 P.2d 529, 546 (1973).
7. Holmes, Book Note, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871). Of course, Holmes's opinion as to
why that is the case and what ought to replace tort is very different from my own. See O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94-96 (1881).
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way people think about themselves as members of a community. Indi-
viduals must comprehend that life in a community entails mutual obliga-
tions and interdependence. The liberal attitude toward health and
misfortune reveals its impoverished sense of community and its modem
tendency to centralised bureaucracy. The maldistribution of risk, injury,
and care is a necessary consequence of this attitude and is deplorable.'
This essay makes a modest attempt to connect the compensation
debate with political and social theory. In so doing, it will expose and
criticise the debate's ideological structure and substance.9 Although his-
tory shows a general movement from charity to citizen rights, from spe-
cial to universal schemes, from minimal to optimal payments, from
private to public sources, the efficiency dictates of a market economy
have always constrained this progress. This essay will outline liberal the-
ory's response to the creation of the welfare state. It will then criticise its
individualistic foundations, normative ambivalence and bureaucratic
consequences. This essay will go on to suggest a democratically-based
alternative and outline its implications for a system of compensation for
bad fortune.
I
THE LIBERAL APPROACH TO ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
While there is little political theorizing that directly and overtly con-
nects up with the compensation debate, there is a vast literature on the
right to well-being. If there does exist a related right to compensation,
embracing some provision of income security and health care, it would
demand the same type of moral and political justification as the right to
well-being itself. Theorists have begun to accept the need for some
scheme of welfare support. Discussion centers on the questions of how
much and to whom. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to canvass the foun-
dational arguments used to justify even a minimal right to well-being.
The central issue, of course, is one of political legitimacy-when is the
state justified in coercing one person to alleviate the distress or suffering
of another? If liberalism is to make a convincing claim that it provides a
workable and principled program for social justice, it must offer a coher-
ent and not simply an expedient explanation for any rights to well-being.
8. In Canada, there is ample evidence of the direct correlation between wealth and health.
See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WELFARE, MEDICARE: THE PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE PRACTICE
16 (1982) (a report on Canada's health insurance system) ("Low-income Canadians face higher than
average risks of premature death, illness and disability.").
9. This essay owes much to the influence of Richard Abel's work. See Abel, A Critique of
American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 199 (1981); Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L.
REV. 695 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Abel, A Socialist Approach]. However, my thesis and conclu-
sions are different from Abel's and ought not to be confused with them. Nevertheless, my debt is a
substantial one and I gladly acknowledge it.
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I will sketch the kind of arguments that a utilitarian, rights-theorist, and
libertarian, representatives of three different strains of liberalism, might
plausibly make to ground a claim by one person against another for her
support. 10
A. The Utilitarian Approach
For the utilitarian, no state of affairs is intrinsically better or worse
than another. Its moral rightness depends on the extent to which it max-
imises social utility. Moral rightness is evaluated by the optimality of
consequences as determined by the felicific calculus. Thus, a right to
well-being is derivative, and society will acknowledge it only if it
improves rather than reduces overall social utility. Assuming the declin-
ing marginal utility of wealth and money,"i a shift of resources from the
rich and healthy to the poor and unhealthy would arguably result in ben-
efits to the latter that would outweigh the costs to the former. In more
obvious moral language, Peter Singer insists that "we ought to prevent
what is bad when we can do so without sacrificing anything of compara-
ble moral significance . *.". . " In making this calculation, the greater
productivity of the many individuals who would be restored to working
health would offset the putative disincentive effects of unearned income
and "free riders." 3
The utilitarian accounts of costs and benefits must balance. While
individualized transfer payments would strike this balance ideally, such a
delivery system would have prohibitive costs. Accordingly, society
would do better to establish a general taxation-welfare scheme. Impor-
tantly, however, within such a regime of well-being rights, "transfers
• . .[would be] undertaken for the sake of a maximizing interest ascribed
to the populace as a whole, and not for the sake of any acknowledged
claim of justice or right on the part of the disadvantaged claimant as an
10. Of course, these are highly stylized and generalized arguments. However, I have tried to
avoid caricature and to present them in their most credible form. In writing this section, I have
benefited immensely from the excellent materials put together by David Beatty at the University of
Toronto Law School. See Personal Income Security in a Liberal Democracy (D. Beatty ed. Sept.
1982) (collected course materials and readings). The work of Ernie Weinrib has also been very
suggestive. See Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). Neither person
would necessarily subscribe to my presentation of liberal arguments. Indeed, the latter likely would
disagree strongly. Another set of influential essays is contained in INCOME SUPPORT: CONCEPTUAL
AND POLICY ISSUES (P. Brown, C. Johnson & P. Vernier eds. 1981).
11. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 56-63
(1953). Not all utilitarians would agree with this assumption. For instance, Posner seems to make
no distinction between the "value" of a dollar in the hands of a billionaire or a beggar. See R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1981).
12. P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 169 (1979). See generally id. at 158-81.
13. See generally W. GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLU-
ENCE ON MODERN MORALS AND HAPPINESS (I. Kramnick 3d ed. 1976).
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individual."14
B. The Rights-Based Approach
The rights-theorists reject the accounting mentality of the utilitari-
ans. They insist on taking the individual seriously and not as a costing
item on a political ledger. They argue that life and health cannot be
reduced to one more set of goods allocated or expended in the name of
increased social efficiency. For the rights-theorist, life and health are
constitutive of the person. Each individual is entitled to be treated with
dignity and as an entity of instrinsic moral worth. Insofar as a society is
best organized to allow individuals to design and pursue their own life
plans, it is axiomatic that physical well-being is a vital precondition to
that goal."5 All healthy persons, therefore, have a duty to contribute to
the well-being of the less healthy in society. However, that duty of
benevolence is not unbounded. The universal concept of personhood also
encompasses healthy people who have no obligation to forego their own
welfare. To expect benevolence is not the same as to demand a self-
defeating commitment to selfless altruism.16 Like the utilitarian, how-
ever, the rights-theorist recognizes that as a matter of efficiency and fair-
ness, it is necessary to coordinate these rights and obligations through a
generalized welfare scheme.17
Although libertarians are but a special kind of rights-theorist, their
case merits separate discussion. The basic libertarian stance opposes all
forms of distributive justice. Libertarians advocate absolute and inviola-
ble moral entitlements to property, provided it was not obtained by force
or fraud. While some moral obligation of philanthrophy may exist, the
government must leave the provision of welfare benefits to private char-
ity. However, even these apparently uncompromising precepts do not
preclude the establishment of some right to well-being, albeit a weak one.
14. Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS:
CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE 319, 326 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
15. See I. KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE 112 (M. Gregor trans. 1964) (Part II of The
Metaphysic of Morals); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 108-28 (1978). Although there is social
responsibility for the less well-off, Fried argues that there is no right to well-being. He argues that
there is only a right to a fair share of money income, so that such individuals can engage in voluntary
risk-pooling. Michelman contends that, even on his own terms, Fried is obliged to recognize a right
to well-being. See Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659.
16. See Weinrib, supra note 10, at 288-92.
17. These arguments do not exhaust the fecundity of the rights-theorizer's arguments. For
instance, although Rawls does not list health care as a primary social good, a plausible argument can
be made for its inclusion in such a category. For a discussion of Rawls' notion of a primary social
good, see J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-95 (1971). Also, those in the Rawlsian original
position would more than likely agree to a universal welfare scheme. For further arguments, see
Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. & PUB. ACE. 146 (1981) and
Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55 (1984).
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For instance, Robert Nozick argues that the use of property is sub-
ject to the Lockean proviso that absolute rights can be exercised only so
long as there be " 'enough and as good left in common for others.' ",,18
He accepts that a person cannot acquire exclusive title to "the total sup-
ply of something necessary for life."' 9 Yet, once this concession is made,
moral intuition suggests that a right to a relatively healthy life justifies
qualifications to property use.20 Further, James Buchanan maintains
that minimal rights to well-being can be established based on the need to
reduce blatant inequalities in the effective opportunities to exercise liber-
tarian rights. He prefers to characterise these rights as accruing through
a person's status as a citizen and not as a victim. Moreover, he argues
that the foundational right to property acts as a powerful fetter on the
tendency to enlarge such rights so as to effect a total redistribution of
wealth.21
II
THE FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL APPROACH
A. Indeterminacy and Alienation
The liberal response to the needs of the poor and unhealthy reflects
liberalism's moral ambivalence and political plasticity. As with any
attempt to apply its theoretical precepts to concrete situations, liber-
alism's approach to well-being founders on the reefs of indeterminacy
and contingency. In all its forms, liberalism begins and ends with the
individual; a thing or state of affairs is only estimable if it is valuable to a
particular individual as actual human experience. Liberalism maintains
that the self-interested actions of individuals represent the most appropri-
ate and effective principled basis for society's economic and political
organization. However, liberalism cannot fulfill its promise to provide a
neutral or objective algorithm by which to mediate the contradictory
forces of individual interest and collective concern.2" Liberal theory is at
a crossroads. Indeed, liberal theory is always at a crossroads. This qual-
ity is what identifies a theory as liberal. Liberalism possesses "no
rational criterion for deciding between claims based on legitimate entitle-
ment against claims based on need."23 Most social arrangements can
18. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974) (quoting J. LOCKE, Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT, Second Treatise, sect. 27 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967)).
19. Id. at 179.
20. For a development of this line of argument, see Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare
State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 888-91 (1976).
21. See Buchanan, Deriving Welfare Rights from Libertarian Rights, in INCOME SUPPORT:
CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY IssuEs 233, 236-45 (P. Brown, C. Johnson & P. Vernier eds. 1981).
22. See Hutchinson & Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L.
REv. 1477, 1482-85 (1984).
23. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4, at 246.
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generate a liberal theory of justification. Moreover, modern society tends
to present the choice, for example, between arms and alms as a "tragic
choice." It constructs ever more complex institutional structures to
obfuscate the moral nature and political consequences of such choices. z4
While they disagree about the redistributive role of the state, both
"faulters" and "no-faulters" envision a similar kind of just society. The
basic dynamic is individualistic and competitive. The only shared experi-
ence is one of alienation. Although liberalism fetes the individual and
celebrates personal freedom and action, it recommends a set of social
organizing principles that rest on a pessimistic notion of human personal-
ity. Individuals are, at best, ambivalent to others; at worst, they are dis-
trustful of others. By expecting the worst of human nature, liberalism
establishes a collective lifestyle that stifles the ameliorating potential in
individuals: "The limits of liberal democracy are the limits of the self-
preoccupied imagination." 5 In a liberal regime, individuals unite only in
their separateness and self-interestedness. They become exiles in their
own society. The dominant motif of liberal society is its tendency
towards anomie and communal disintegration. Bereft of any sense of
community, "[o]ur society may have become so anomic that explicit
occasions for mutual recognition among strangers on public streets are
more feared than sought." 6
The attitudes of both "faulters" and "no-faulters" toward compen-
sation exemplify the full force of this political scenario. The common
law task is to restore individuals to the position they were in before the
accident. In its more grandiloquent moments, tort insists on the "general
underlying principle. . . that whoever unlawfully injures another shall
make him whole."2 7 The "no faulters" do not object to this standard.
However, they want all of society to bear this burden and to make com-
pensation available regardless of the injury's particular cause. In short,
they seek to universalize the compensation standards of the "faulters."
The traditional requirements of an accident and some identifiable and
isolatable cause remain central.
Clearly, the "no-fault" proposals represent a substantial improve-
ment over the prevailing "fault" status quo. Yet, even these proposals
are much too limited in their remedial and distributive ambitions. The
"no-faulters" share with the "faulters" the same liberal objective: to
ensure through the payment of money and the provision of institutional
health care that victims are reconstituted. Victims can then reassume
their roles as rugged operatives in the bruising market of individual com-
24. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
25. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 18 (1984).
26. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 41 (1979).
27. Bullerdick v. Pritchard, 90 Colo. 272, 275, 8 P.2d 705, 706 (1932).
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petition. Where the misfortune is too great to allow such reconstruction,
the aim is to ensure that the individual is able to live out her days in
reduced physical discomfort, at a minimal level of material satisfaction.
Economics and efficiency always temper care and concern.
Like their "fault" counterparts, most "no-faulters" are too easily
content with the prevailing malapportionment of wealth and its accom-
panying liberal ideology. Indeed, the correlation between wealth and
health is so marked that any genuine attempt to improve the quality of
health and health care must deal with the maldistribution of wealth and
its institutional structure.2" Enforcing stricter rules on collateral benefits
and placing a ceiling on compensation payments might reduce that part
of the maldistribution due to the tort system. However, these measures,
while useful,29 do not tackle the problem directly. They do not address
the urgent need to establish a democratic and communal responsibility
for the control of health risks and the provision of health care.
B. Health as a Commodity: The Tragedy of the Disabled
In pursuing the liberal approach, the market has converted health
into another commodity to be traded for and traded off. Human life and
suffering represent just one more variable in the production-consumption
equation. Even "no-faulters" like Bernzweig and Conard talk in terms of
restoring individuals to their fullest usefulness. They indirectly (and, no
doubt, unintentionally) present the unhealthy as defective goods.3" In a
chilling assessment, Blumstein and Zubkoff argue that "[t]he 'special-
ness' of medical care exists only up to a certain threshold; beyond that it
becomes just another consumer item."3 Health is business and health
care is big business. 32 Drug manufacturers are some of the wealthiest
corporations and doctors one of the highest-paid professions. Yet, surely
"[p]rofiteering [from ill-health] reflects exploitation in its most egregious
form."' 33 The rapid growth of public health-care programs has created
increased opportunites for the private health care industry to exploit.
The expansion of social compensation schemes will almost certainly
exacerbate that situation.
28. See supra note 8.
29. It can be argued that a ceiling on compensation payments would aggravate existing income
maldistribution. See Abel, A Socialist Approach , supra note 9, at 696 n.3.
30. See E. BERNZWEIG, By ACCIDENT, NOT DESIGN 163 (1980); Conard, The Economic
Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REv. 279, 294-95 (1964).
31. Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Realth Sector, 51 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 395, 411 (1973).
32. See A. BLOMQVIST, THE HEALTH CARE BUSINESS (1979); S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT
WENT WRONG 1-2 (2d ed. 1976).
33. H. WAITZKIN & B. WATERMAN, THE EXPLOITATION OF ILLNESS IN CAPITALIST SOCI-
ETY 108 (1974); see also Kelman, Toward the Political Economy of Medical Care, INQUIRY, Sept.
1971, at 30.
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The attitude of health as a commodity is reflected throughout soci-
ety. The victims of bad fortune face severe systemic and personal obsta-
cles to a full integration into communal life. The victim's agony is not
merely the physical pain, but the frightening realization that she has been
destroyed as a person. Accident victims' self-esteem and confidence in
the community "become as ashes in [their] mouth[s]."34 People's
responses to the disabled and unfortunate comprise a mixture of contra-
dictory feelings, combining pity and compassion with embarrassment
and revulsion. Disability forces persons to face some uncomfortable facts
about their own fragile vulnerability and the aleatory unpleasantness of
their environment. Yet this insecurity also inhibits others from offering
the communal support victims so vitally require to come to terms with
their bad fortune. As a result, people close their eyes, if not their hearts,
to the plight of the disabled, who become " 'a hidden population...
unknown to the communities and individuals around them.' "3
Although social rehabilitation must take precedence over job place-
ment, the opportunity to work and make a meaningful contribution to
the community must rank high in any list of priorities, no matter what
the political affiliation of the society.36 In North America, however, the
unemployment rate among the disabled exceeds the general average of
10% more than five fold.37 Also, many disabled who do work are part-
time employees who receive low pay. Those who become disabled while
in full-time employment often have a reduced earning capacity and face
imposed early retirement.38 However, evidence shows that, if given the
chance, the disabled can and do work extremely well.3 9 They often are
refused jobs merely because they are disabled rather than because they
34. R. LEWISTON, HIT FROM BOTH SIDES 32 (1967).
35. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDI-
VIDUAL ABILITIES 17 (1983) (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 3320-21 (1972) (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams)). For a powerful examination of the plight of the disabled child, see J. GLIEDMAN & W.
ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA 380 (1980).
Even the relatively sensitive and sophisticated New Zealand scheme spends less than one per-
cent of its budget on social-rehabilitation programs. See T. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 156
(1980).
36. My colleague Terry Ison has pointed out to me that this lament about the absence of
employment opportunities smacks of 'liberalism,' especially its incorporation of the work ethic. My
view, like his, is that while work opportunities for the disabled should be increased, we should make
it much more respectable and acceptable for disabled people not to work. As Ison states, "[t]o
expect them to work while the opportunities are lacking creates the worst of both worlds, and is
probably a significant cause of distress." Memorandum from Terry Ison to Allan Hutchinson 3
(March 11, 1985) (discussing this essay as a work-in-progress).
37. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 29 (1983); CANADA
HOUSE OF COMMONS SPECIAL COMM. ON THE DISABLED AND THE HANDICAPPED, OBSTACLES 31
(1981).
38. See D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD &
Y. BRITAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 270-72, 274-78 (1984).
39. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 30.
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cannot perform the job satisfactorily.' Unless and until there is a sub-
stantial change in society's attitude to the disabled and unfortunate, the
situation will remain bleak.
C. Bureaucracy and the Welfare State
Whatever the good intentions of some 'no-faulters', they suffer from
a certain liberal myopia. They do not seem to grasp that the universal-
ization of health care in modem liberal society carries with it the very
real threat of increased bureaucratization and the further institutionaliza-
tion of human values. Even when a compensation scheme is sufficiently
comprehensive and adequately financed,41 it requires a massive regula-
tory structure to administer the available benefits. Yet the experience of
the last two decades strongly suggests that the growth of a sprawling
welfare bureaucracy has created a troubling paradox. The bureaucracy
relieves individuals of the anxiety borne of the struggle to maintain a
basic standard of health and living. However, they still suffer the
debilitating effects of powerlessness, dependence, and loss of self-respect.
The modern welfare state places individuals in a state of "bondage to the
bureaucratic machine."'42
As individuals become enmeshed within the ample embrace of the
welfare system, they lose a sense of their own individuality and see them-
selves as administrative charges on the common purse. Contemporary
society demeans and dehumanizes recipients of state assistance. More-
over, the pervasiveness of the welfare bureaucracy discourages self-help
and communal support. The bureaucracy tends to buttress the hierarchi-
cal structure of modern society and to engender hostility to the "unde-
serving poor."43 The hopeful ethic of social work has succumbed to the
intrusive ideology of law and bureaucracy.
The concerns of law and management have converged in the three basic
themes of the recent literature and practice of welfare administration:
first, the formalization of entitlement, by which I mean the formulation
of the eligibility norms as rules; second, the bureaucratization of admin-
stration, by which I mean the intensification of formally hierarchical
organization; and third, the proletarianization of the work force, by
which I mean the diminution of the status, skill, education, and reward
40. See McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999,
1008-13 (1981).
41. For instance, the British welfare system suffers in both these respects. See F. FIELD, INE-
QUALITY IN BRITAIN 68-91 (1981). Also, the need for ever greater public funding is in large part
due to the private cost of drugs and medical care. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
42. M. WALZER, RADICAL PRINCIPLES 33 (1980).
43. See J. HANDLER & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, THE DESERVING POOR: A STUDY OF WEL-
FARE ADMINISTRATION (1971); Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration ofAid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971).
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associated with the frontline welfare worker's job."
Even the crucial encounter between doctor and patient reflects the
destructive and hierarchical nature of the contemporary regimes for
health care and general welfare. What should be an intimate occasion
often becomes a clinical, remote exchange. As health care becomes
increasingly technological and bureaucratic, medical treatment reduces
individuals to "limp and mystified voyeur[s]"'45 of the treatment of their
own bodies. The medical establishment expects patients to be the passive
objects of therapy rather than active participants. The demise of home
visits ensures that consultation occurs on the doctor's own professional
turf. Indeed, the asymmetrical relation between doctor and patient
depends on the patient's continuing ignorance.
Doctors' ability to control and manipulate the distribution of techni-
cal knowledge maintains the power of the medical profession. Indeed,
the medical and welfare establishment has assumed for itself the consid-
erable privilege of defining 'health' and 'disability.' Of course, health is a
contested concept and it has been the target of sustained attempts at ide-
ological appropriation. Descriptive and scientific language dominates
medical discourse. This technical veneer conceals loaded values and
commitments. 6 Economic and political interests have largely deter-
mined the historical development of the concepts of "need" and "wel-
fare."' Health care thus remains inseparable from the political struggle
to regulate individual and social conduct. It forms part of the carceral
framework through which professionals effect "the universal reign of the
normative."4" In contemporary society, ill-health has become a type of
deviancy and doctors the high priests of absolution.
If "no-fault" schemes are grafted on to the existing political organi-
sation and economic conditions of modem liberal life, they will operate
as much as a crutch for a crippled society as a means for social improve-
ment. The dark side of proposals by "no-faulters" is further bureaucratic
alienation and loss of personal involvement in health care. However, we
need not throw out the remedial baby with the harmful bathwater. Pro-
vided they integrate their proposals into a broader program of social
reconstruction, "no-faulters" can act as a catalyst for a "revolution in
44. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199
(1983).
45. See I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 53 (1975); see also
S. LAW, supra note 32, at 143.
46. See Edelman, The Political Language of the Helping Professions, 4 POL. & SoC'y 295
(1974).
47. See D. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984).
48. M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 304 (1977); see also




democratic consciousness." 49 By making good on the presently lame and
ambivalent commitment to democracy, society could generate the sense
of community necessary to ground the terms for collective life, a life in
which all might achieve their individual potential. After outlining my
response to this dilemma, I will canvass its implications for compensa-
tion and treatments of accidents and their social consequences.
III
A RADICAL PRESCRIPTION
A. Elimination of Domination and Hierarchies
Any radical program must aim to rid society of the prevailing condi-
tions of social oppression which subvert individual emancipation and
self-determination." The achievement of any such program is condi-
tional on an understanding that individuals only exist in and are consti-
tuted by a social milieu. "Individual liberty is meaningless until it is
incorporated within particular forms of social life. . . ."" Any plausi-
ble political theory must accept two related insights about what individu-
als share: a common vulnerability to injury and domination, and a
common capacity to envisage a better life beyond their present condition.
The only way for individuals to respond to these human traits is to move
beyond individual interest to communal solidarity. Individuals' shared
vulnerability and frustrated potential are the basis for hope, not despair.
These frailties present an occasion for expressing and showing our com-
mon humanity.
By developing a moral sense and practical experience of community,
individuals could better contribute to the growth of a shared set of values
in accordance with which social and individual life would be organised.
The challenge is to establish an informed and democratic balance
between the availability of personal choices and the existence of commu-
nal bonds. Society would respect people as people, and not simply as
rights holders. In this way, society could develop a modus vivendi that
encourages caring and sharing and actualises the possibility for meaning-
ful connection with others. Communal concern would help assuage anx-
49. C. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 184 (1973).
50. These arguments and ideas are developed and explored further in Hutchinson & Monahan,
supra note 22, at 1528-37, and Hutchinson, Of Kings and Dirty Rascals: The Struggle for Democ-
racy, 9 QUEENS L.J. 273 (1984). These proposals, like much of the earlier critique, fall within the
intellectual parameters of the Critical Legal Studies movement. In response to recent allegations and
condemnations, I want to suggest that these proposals are not "nihilistic" nor are they likely to
"result in the learning of the skills of corruption, bribery and intimidation." See Carrington, Of Law
and The River, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 227 (1984). For a journalistic account of the heated exchange
Carrington's charges have provoked, see A Scholarly War of Words over Academic Freedom, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
51. M. WALZER, supra note 42, at 12.
[Vol. 73:755
BEYOND NO-FA UL T
iety over vulnerability, ensure that risks were distributed equally, and
provide care for the unhealthy. Communal support would maximise the
genuine opportunities for individual freedom of action within a context
of social stability.
We need a rejuvenated commitment to a strong democratic impera-
tive. Those affected by institutional decisions and policy must participate
in their making. Democracy's pale and perverse contemporary practice
is anathema to its full-blooded ideal. In modem society, participation is
reduced to a formal and sporadic ritual. Economic inequality under-
mines political equality. Democratic practice represents an accommo-
dating public screen behind which the political drama of private power is
played out. A substantive and just version of democratic life must
replace the offensive and empty symbolism of modem democracy.
Efforts to mobilize the presently lethargic energies of individuals must
accompany a devolution of bureaucratic power. Democracy is not a for-
mal theory of political organisation, it is a potent way of daily life.
Democracy entails the greatest possible engagement by individuals
in the greatest possible range of communal tasks and public action.
Where feasible, individuals must directly confront one another without
any bureaucratic mediation. As individuals reclaim control over their
own lives, they will develop an appetite and a talent for even greater
communal determination. Increased political engagement will exploit
the vast untapped resources of popular power and sustain its own
momentum.52 While democracy promotes the common and communal,
it also provides a structure within which to enhance the unique and the
individual. In time, a profound and sensitive understanding of the dia-
lectical tension between individual and community will emerge. The
design is not to develop a romantic or utopian harmony, but a political
order which facilitates individual participation in the continuing social
deliberation over political ends. 3
The benefits and freedom that come with democratic solidarity are
not costless. Apart from demanding a gracious humility and an unre-
lenting magnanimity, democrats must make a major personal commit-
ment to the maintenance and improvement of the participatory structure
and process. The required commitment is an exhausting, but exhilarat-
ing experience. However, individuals would defeat the purpose of social
change if they engaged in mindless masochism, expending all their ener-
gies in perfecting the democratic process without living the life it is
intended to make possible. 4 Also, a democratic society must always
52. B. BARBER, supra note 25, at 272; see also id. at 158.
53. See generally J. COHEN & J. RoGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 146-83 (1983).
54. See M. WALZER, supra note 42, at 130.
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guard itself against the error of freezing its own structures, and thereby
institutionalizing another mode of domination. Society must therefore
constantly redraft the agenda of political debate and action. Gerald Frug
succinctly states the fundamental challenge as follows:
New forms of human association designed to take the place of bureau-
cracy must themselves be subject to the same critique. But this critique
has its limits-there is a stopping place. This would be reached when
people abandoned abstract arguments that seek to defend some form of
life as a structure that can protect human individuality-when people
jointly recognize that no structure can protect us from each other given
the variable, intersubjective, interdependent nature of human relation-
ships. The forms of organization that would then be created would not
be understood as an answer to the human predicament. They would be
transparently open to transformation (no form of organization is neces-
sary) and always in need of transformation (all forms of organization
create forms of domination that need to be combatted).
• . . Only by creating these forms together can people confront the
intersubjective nature of social life. . . . In this view, the term "par-
ticipatory democracy" does not describe a fixed series of limited possibili-
ties of human organization but the ideal under which possibilities of joint
transformation of social life are collected.55
B. Planning for Social Change
The problem facing any radical program is to translate its theoreti-
cal postulates into attainable dimensions of concrete human experience.
We must not overlook or underestimate this task. Yet, in dealing with
questions of health care and income support, the challenge is perhaps not
as hopeless as it might first appear. Indeed, the present state of affairs
manages both to highlight the dismal record of liberal democratic prac-
tices, and to suggest the exciting possibilities for democratic participa-
tion. The centralized bureaucratization of welfare places a divisive
barrier between individuals and distances people from the making of
decisions about their own lives. Yet this very process opens up opportu-
nities for democratic involvement. As both the powerful and the power-
less come to rely on the state provision of welfare, there emerges a shared
focus for their opposing claims and objectives. As long as care is taken to
avoid replicating the competitive and elite pluralism of representative
democracy, popular involvement in the administrative process is the
shortest and most effective route to a more just society. Popular partici-
pation will thus help to bridge the gap between administrators and citi-
zens. In the context of compensation schemes, the actual and potential
55. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1295-96
(1984).
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victims of bad fortune (i.e., everyone) must take responsibility for their
own exposure to risk.
The democratic society must aim to entrench individuals within the
local centres of the policymaking process. "Social policies cannot be
imposed by beneficient social administrators; people must be involved in
their provision and experience them as part of their local society."5 6
Most importantly, individuals must be able to participate fully in their
own treatment and recovery. We must break down the strict division
and characterization of medical and nonmedical roles. Individuals need
to educate themselves as to the value of personal preventive medicine and
the contribution they can make to their own healing. Patients must
involve themselves in the formulation of any rehabilitation or treatment
program. We must not relegate the welfare recipient to the status of
client or claimant. The need for a sense of belonging is never more
urgent then when misfortune strikes. Although society will continue to
maintain a corps of professional carers,58 each individual must become a
"welfare worker," contributing to her own personal health and to that of
the overall community. As Alastair Campbell rightly warns: "The
notion of health care involves mutual learning, mutual help and mutual
responsibility. A society which ignores this may stave off, for a time, the
effects of illness and injury, but only to pave a better road to ill-health."5 9
When individuals begin to realize the benefits of active participation
and acquire a taste for further communal involvement, they will appreci-
ate the contingent character of social life. Communal attention will turn
toward setting appropriate standards for health and health care. Even
the fully democratic society will have to make "tragic choices" about the
allocation of scarce resources.' Yet the visible and personal hand of
democracy is preferable to the invisible and impersonal hand of the mar-
ket. Although the community of informed individuals will decide the
issue, they might think it appropriate to designate health care as a
nonmarket good, taking it out of the distributive forum of competitive
choice. Neighborhood boards of doctors, patients, and local residents
will govern hospitals and local clinics. Medical research funding can be
wrested from the exclusive control of medical experts and private corpo-
rations, and placed under greater public scrutiny. While medical tech-
nology advances apace, its direction is not presently open to direct public
control. For instance, much medical research has been devoted to the
56. Glennerster, The Need for a Reappraisal, in THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE 1, 8
(H. Glennerster ed. 1983); see also S. LAW, supra note 32, at 149-52.
57. For a series of depressing examples on this point, see T. ISON, supra note 35, at 143-45.
58. See D. HORROBIN, MEDICAL HUBRIS: A REPLY TO IVAN ILLICH 106-43 (1977).
59. A. CAMPBELL, MEDICINE, HEALTH AND JUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES 88
(1978).
60. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 24.
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reduction of mortality, but this has meant a corresponding increase in
morbidity, especially among the elderly. 6 Society must address ques-
tions about the treatment of malformed babies, geriatics, paraplegics, and
other afflicted individuals. The choice for continuance of life as opposed
to quality of life has been made by default. This choice deserves to be the
subject of a more thoroughgoing democratic debate so that an informed
communal consensus might be developed.
Society must aim for communal health-care services which work
toward a local, supportive environment for recovery or readjustment. Of
course, some provision for domestic health care already exists, but these
programs receive inadequate funds and half-hearted community support.
Furthermore, in an individualistic society, these programs place a heavy
burden on family care-givers, especially women kin.62 Lacking any real
community support, carers and cared-for are trapped in a mutually sus-
picious and destructive relationship. Existing community and home-care
programs utilise their idealistic image in order to justify and excuse lim-
ited public action.63 Before any substantial improvement can take place,
society must thoroughly change its thinking about health and health
maintenance.
We must develop a greater appreciation that health and welfare are
as much socially caused as individually experienced. To develop this
appreciation we must foster a more holistic approach to well-being.
Health care should not merely treat individual symptoms. It should con-
cern itself with the total environment in which people live, work, play,
and die. The control of risk would be of at least the same importance as
the treatment of injury and misfortune.' 4 In a vigourously democratic
society, citizens would determine assumption and allocation of risk dem-
ocratically. The presumption would be that all of society should share
risk collectively and equally. In short, the maxim that an ounce of
prevention is better than a pound of cure would be taken seriously and
acted upon.
61. See D. HORROBIN, supra note 58, at 24; Hacker, 'Welfare. The Future ofAn Illusion, N.Y.
REv. BooKs, February 28, 1985, at 37, 38.
62. See Note, Home Health Care for the Elderly: Programs, Problems, and Potentials, 22
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 193, 213-15 (1985).
63. Some countries have progressed in this area. On the available evidence, Sweden seems like
a good example. See Liljestrim, Sweden, in FAMILY POLICY 19 (S. Kamerman & A. Kahn eds.
1978).
64. In current capitalist society, individuals are unable to control their exposure to risk, espe-
cially at work. For a discussion of the problem of work-related illness and death, see Glasbeck &
Rowland, Are Injuring and Killing at Work Crimes?, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 506, 507-11 (1979).




In this short essay, I have sought to expose and criticize the individ-
ualistic foundations of both the "fault" and "no-fault" contributions to
the modem compensation debate. Only by struggling to establish a dem-
ocratic community of respectful beliefs and shared practices can society
develop a humane response to death and injury. "There is a difference
. . . between what we would do as individuals competing in a market
and what we would do as members of the public building a conception of
ourselves as a community."66 Whereas the democratic society takes an
integrated and coherent stance on risk and well-being, the liberal society
adopts a divided and contradictory position. Many will no doubt deride
and dismiss my suggestions as hopelessly utopian. But, since these sug-
gestions only involve making good on our preexisting commitment to
democracy, such criticism reveals liberal theory's fearful lack of vision
and the extent of its enslavement to the status quo. Of course, theorizing
is insufficient by itself; it must be accompanied by appropriate action.
Yet efforts to change our ways of thinking about ourselves and efforts to
change society "are profoundly interconnected, if for no other reason
than that [theorizing] is a part of the social world as well as a conception
of it."67 There is nothing so practical as a good theory.
66. Sagoff, On Markets for Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 755, 773 (1982).
67. A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 13 (1970).
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